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In this essay I examine Kant's analogy with life from §65 of the Critique of the power of 
Judgment. I argue that this analogy is central for understanding his notion of a natural end, for 
his account of the formative power of organisms in the third Critique, and for situating Kant's 
account of this power in relation to the Lebenskräfte of the vitalists. 
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Kant on Vital Forces and The Analogy with Life1  
 
§1 – Introduction 
Kant holds matter, as matter, is inert; it is only moved by external forces or chemical 
powers (MFNS, 4:544). But organisms, paradoxically, are physical beings that seem to move 
themselves in a teleological way. To account for this apparent self-motion, and in developing his 
conception of organisms as natural ends, Kant relies on a number of analogies, including with 
artifacts, natural beauty, political states, and our own rational powers. Another such analogy is 
with life:  
Perhaps one comes closer to this inscrutable property [i.e., the causality particular to natural 
ends] if one calls it an analogue of life: but then one must either endow matter as mere matter 
with a property (hylozoism) that contradicts its essence, or else associate with it an alien 
principle standing in communion with it (a soul), in which case, however, if such a product is to 
be a product of nature, organized matter as an instrument of that soul is {either}2 already 
presupposed, and thus makes that product not the least more comprehensible, or else the soul 
is made into an artificer of this structure, and the product must be withdrawn from (corporeal) 
nature. Strictly speaking, the organization of nature is therefore not analogous with any 
causality that we know.  (KU, 5:375-376) 
While many interpreters quote the conclusion of this passage, not many attend to the analogy 
itself. Perhaps this is in part because the conclusion can sound dismissive. Or perhaps this is 
because it is uncommon for interpreters to attend to the distinction between the concepts of 
<life> and <organized matter> (or <organism>) on which the analogy depends. 
Nonetheless, not only is this passage the climax of Kant’s discussion of the distinctive 
kind of material causality particular to natural ends, but it is also the key to situating Kant in 
relation to the debate over vital forces. Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb, Wolff’s vis essentialis, or 
Herder’s organische Kräfte, are all vital forces or life powers (Lebenskräfte). These forces are 
conceived on the model of Newtonian forces. They are supposed to be forces in nature that 
are at work in all living beings and that explain their peculiar self-motion.3 Here I set out to 
show that even if van den Berg might be right that Kant “does not explicitly point his 
‘regulative guns’ at the concept of vital force” in his critical period (2009, 116), he does so 
implicitly in the analogy with life passage. 
 
1  There is significant overlap between §2-4 of this essay, and §3 of my “Kant on Plants: Self-activity, 
Representations, and the Analogy with Life.” That essay does not address vital forces.  
2 The Cambridge ed. is missing the ‘either’: “jener Seele entweder schon voraussetzt” (my emph). 
3 I will dwell neither on the controversies between the 18th century vitalists, nor on Kant’s relation to them. The 
main fault line in the discussion of these issues is over how much of an influence Kant had on Blumenbach and 
his Göttingen school. Timothy Lenoir argued it was large, while Caneva, Zammito, and Richards argued that 
Lenoir overstates this influence. 
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In it Kant is setting out to explain the material causality peculiar to natural ends or 
organisms. He does this by appealing to their formative power. This power is similar to the 
life-powers of these vitalists in that it too purports to explain the peculiar self-motion of 
organisms. We will see, however, that Kant holds life is the power of an immaterial being, a 
soul, to interact with a material being, an organism. And in rejecting the analogy with life, Kant 
is making clear that the formative power is not a life power, a Lebenskraft.  
Still, the formative power is a teleological power. Teleological powers cannot be 
determinatively cognized as part of the mechanical natural world. At most they must be 
regulatively presupposed in the investigation of nature, and the formative power of an 
organism is like this. In this respect, we will see that the analogy with life does make the 
formative power more comprehensible. For, just as the soul directs the parts of the body so 
as to achieve its ends, the formative power directs the parts of an organism so as to maintain 
the whole.  
It will turn out then that although the formative power is unlike the soul, in that it is 
not an immaterial principle of life, it is like the soul in that it is a teleological power. And even 
if Kant held that life powers are not admissible in natural teleology, the analogy with them is 
illuminating, up to a point.  
 
§2 – Organisms as natural ends 
In §64 and §65 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant presents his notion of a 
natural purpose or end (Naturzweck) and uses the example of a tree to exhibit three causal 
powers particular to natural ends: reproduction, growth, and self-maintenance or preservation. 
Something is a natural end or purpose, according to Kant, if “it is cause and effect of itself” (KU, 
5.370). This definition includes two components, one of which natural ends share with 
artifacts, the other of which is distinctive.  First, take a watch. “In a watch one part is the 
instrument [Werkzeug] for the motion of another” (5:374). There is a common form that unites 
all of the parts together into the whole, and this form ensures that each part is “present for 
the sake of the other.” Second, unlike the watch, the tree has the power to circulate sap, take 
in oxygen, repair damage, create seeds, etc. In this respect, an organized being is more than a 
mere machine because it not only has “a motive power” (bewegende Kraft), but also “a formative 
power” (bildende Kraft) (KU, 5:375), where the latter power communicates a form to matter that 
does not have it, by organizing it. 
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In section §65 Kant presents his concept of a natural end as a “determinate concept” 
in order to make precise this sense in which natural ends are related to themselves, reciprocally, 
as both cause and effects of themselves (KU, 5:370). In the case of the watch, the cause of the 
order and motion of the parts is external to it. It lies in the watch maker and her intention to 
build the watch according to her concept of it. This is the origin of the form of the watch. 
And in this respect the concept is the cause but not the effect of the watch. A natural end, 
however, is natural. We know of no natural cause that could imbue its parts with their form 
or their causality. Rather, as natural, its parts must themselves be cause and effect of their 
form, and of each other through that form. It is as if the watch and its parts were themselves 
the watch maker—as if they were the cause that brought the form into each other.  
To describe the peculiarity of this kind of material causality, it will help to look at 
Kant’s notion of an end (Zweck). As Newton notes (2017, 521), Kant defines an end both (1) 
as “the concept of an object insofar as it at the same time contains the ground of the reality of 
this object” (KU, 5:180, my emphasis) and (2) as the “object of a concept insofar as the latter is 
regarded as the cause of the former” (KU, 5:220, my emphasis). In the case of the watch, say, 
the end will be both the concept the watch maker has through which she produces the watch, 
as well as the watch itself that is produced. In the case of the tree, however, there is no known 
maker or intention. As Kant puts it, the “being that would possess the causality according to 
concepts appropriate for such a product” is unknown (KU, 5:373). For this reason, there is no 
end, as a concept, that we cognize as the intention through which the tree is produced.  
Still, as many have noted, Kant holds that we judge that it is as though the organism was 
intentionally created in accord with a concept we posit, as if by some supernatural creator. 
This concept or universal is the species-form of the organism. And one mark of an objective 
end like a watch or a tree is the order (or “perfection,” KU, 5:375; FI, 20:228) found in it. This 
order in the object is measured against “the concept of what sort of thing it is supposed to be” (KU, 
5:227; FI, 20:228). Insofar as the species-form is supposed to be more than a mere model—
insofar as it is also supposed to be, like the concept of the watch, the ideal cause of the 
organism—however, we know of no causal power that can bring this natural product about. 
The reason is not merely that this product exhibits an order for which we cannot find 
a cause, but that it itself seems to be its own cause. The organism, as a natural end or purpose, 
is cause and effect of itself insofar as, like the watch, the parts are conceived of as existing for 
the sake of all of the other parts on account of the whole, through their form. In this respect, 
Kant compares the parts of the natural end to instruments (Werkzeugen/organs) or gears (5:374), 
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which the maker combines to make the product (e.g., the watch or end as object), in 
accordance with the idea of it (e.g., the watch plan or end as concept). But unlike the watch 
(and its gears), the parts of the natural end must also produce the other parts, in accord with 
their form as organs (e.g., roots, leaves, etc.), and produce the organism (e.g., tree) as the 
combination of these parts. In this respect, these organs are not merely brought together 
through the idea of an end in an external maker, but make themselves and their form, insofar 
as they both bring the form of the organism (end as concept) into matter that didn’t have it to 
create organs and bring this form into the organism as a whole (end as object).4  
Now, even considering only the natural formative power to grow, heal, and reproduce 
itself, Kant thinks we should be wary about claiming that organisms actually are natural ends. 
Being an end entails a creator with an intention, and with organisms we do not have insight 
into such a creating cause (e.g., KU, 5:400). In line with this, although Kant titles §65, “things, 
as natural ends, are organized beings,” he often seems to treat <organized being> or <organism> 
as empirical concepts, while he treats the concept <natural end> as an a priori idea of reason 
(e.g., KU, 5:405; FI, 20:233). This a priori idea seems to then be specified in the empirical ideas 
of specific species-forms (e.g., KU, 5:373), and we judge that it is as if organisms fall under the 
concept <natural end> or the more determinate concept of their species-form. Still, because 
we don’t cognize the intentionally acting cause that created organisms, we are not permitted 
to make a judgment about how the thing in fact is—i.e., about the intention with which it was 
in fact made—but can only make a judgment that guides our investigations in to it, as if it were 
made in accordance with the species-form we posit. 
 
§3 – Life and hylozoism 
The analogy with life passage, begins:  
Perhaps one comes closer to this inscrutable property [i.e., the material causality particular to 
organisms] if one calls it an analogue of life: but then one must either endow matter as mere 
matter with a property (hylozoism) that contradicts its essence […]  (KU, 5:375-376) 
What is hylozoism? And what is life, for Kant? Life, in the context of an embodied being, 
indicates the connection between a material and an immaterial substance (A393). This position 
from the first Critique is supported by the explanations consistently given across the 
metaphysics lectures.5 In these, Kant will distinguish life, as the interaction (commercio) of a 
 
4 This sketch of Kant’s account of the structure of the causal powers found in organisms combines elements 
from McLaughlin (2014) and Ginsborg (2015).  
5 See: Met-L1, 28:282-287; Met-K2, 28:753-755, 736, Met-D, 28:671; Met-M, 28:904-914; Met-V, 28:441. 
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material body with a soul, from the principle of life, which is this immaterial soul. To take one 
characteristic example, in the 1782/83 Mrongovius transcripts he calls the connection of the 
soul and the body, their “interaction <commercium>” and says this “constitutes life” (Met-M, 
29:904; 29:908). He then claims that, “thus the principle of life with human beings is not the 
body, but rather the soul” (29:914).6  
He discusses hylozoism more fully in a passage from the Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science. There he claims that “matter, as such, is lifeless” (4:544). The Second Law of 
Mechanics, the law of inertia, states, “every change in matter has an external cause” (4:543), 
and “the inertia of matter is, and means, nothing else than its lifelessness, as matter in itself” 
(4:544). Whereas, 
Life is the faculty of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal principle, of a finite 
substance to change, and of a material substance [to determine itself] to motion or rest, as 
change of its state.7  
Properly speaking, in this passage Kant presents three conceptions of life. The first, in terms 
of self-activity, will apply to finite and infinite beings. The second, as a self-active change, is 
restricted to finite beings. And the third, as self-active change in motion, is restricted to material 
finite things. The third will be our focus.  
Because the explanation of life here is in terms of motion and rest it is proper to the 
science of extended nature—physical, movable objects—and it seems to allow that material 
beings can be alive. But as the rest of the Foundations passage attests, this is not 
straightforwardly so. In the next sentence Kant turns to the issue of what exactly this internal 
principle of self-activity might be: 
Now we know no other internal principle in a substance for changing its state except desiring, 
and no other internal activity at all except thinking, together with that which depends on it, the 
feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and desire or willing. 
Here Kant is drawing on a further explanation of life. Kant will describe life as: “the faculty 
of a being to act in accordance with its representations,” where “the faculty of desire 
[Begehrungsvermögen] is the faculty to be, by means of one’s representations, the cause of the 
objects of these representations” (MM, 6:211; also, KpV, 5:9n; Met-M, 29:894; ÜGTP, 8:181; 
R1034, 15:465). Thus, for embodied beings to be alive is to have a faculty of representation, 
 
6 In many contexts it is important to distinguish two dimensions of the soul: (1) as the ground of 
representations in the subject, and (2) as the intelligible supersensible ground of activity. In the analogy with life 
passage, Kant is not sharply distinguishing these, so I will not dwell on this here.  
7 (MFNS, 4:544). Compare also, e.g., Met-L2, 28:594; Met-L1, 28:275; DSS, 2:329, as well as many of the 
concluding passages of the metaphysics lectures on the souls of non-rational animate beings. 
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specifically desire, through which it can be the cause of the objects of its representations in 
the material world. 
In the remainder of the paragraph, Kant then argues that we should not allow the 
explanation of life in terms of self-motion to lure us into thinking that matter as matter can be 
alive. Desiring, thinking, or feeling are internal actions. They are not something that we can 
represent through the outer senses and we cannot directly see or touch them. According to 
Kant, however, matter is what is in principle perceivable by such senses, where this will include 
things like magnetic matter, which is in space, although not perceivable by us (A226/B273, 
also KU, 5:467). Acts of mind, however, are not in space. So matter as matter—what is in 
space—cannot be endowed with the powers to act in these ways. It would be tantamount to 
matter being both in and not in space. Hylozoism is the contradictory position that endows 
matter with these powers (MFNS, 4:544). And because it is contradictory, he claims “if we 
seek the cause of any change of matter in life, we will have to seek it forthwith in another 
substance, different from matter, yet combined with it.”8 
In the analogy with life passage Kant quickly considers hylozoism in relation to 
organisms, and again rejects living matter as contradictory, presumably for this same reason: 
life involves inner powers and acts that are not spatial, and so cannot be physical.9 Physical 
matter, as such, cannot be alive. Because it is contradictory, this version of the analogy isn’t 
going to be of use in helping us account for the apparently self-active material causality 
particular to organisms. After all, the concept of living matter—strictly speaking—doesn’t make 
sense.  
 
§4 – The soul as pilot or as builder & engineer 
 After rejecting hylozoism, Kant turns to the material causality particular to organisms 
and examines whether more of an account can be had by associating with the organism “an 
alien principle standing in communion with it (a soul).” In this case,  
if such a product [(the organism)] is to be a product of nature, organized matter as an 
instrument of that soul is {either} already presupposed, and thus makes that product not the 
least more comprehensible, or else the soul is made into an artificer of this structure, and the 
product must be withdrawn from (corporeal) nature. (KU, 5:375-376) 
 
8 (4:544; also e.g., DSS, 2:327n) Kant makes this argument often, although it is usually compressed. 
9 Another form of hylozoism Kant considers, besides the just discussed living matter (lebenden Materie), is “the 
possibility of an animated matter [belebten Materie] and of the whole of nature as an animal” (KU, 5:394). Kant, 
however, does not seem to hold this form of hylozoism to be contradictory (just unexplanatory), and so it is not 
what he has in mind in the analogy. 
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Here Kant considers two options for how the immaterial soul could stand in communion with 
the organized body.  
On the first, the soul uses the body like a tool, as though it were, say, a pilot in a ship. 
He rejects this as a way of understanding the formative power of organisms because it doesn’t 
actually make this power more comprehensible. It is like trying to comprehend the self-
maintaining powers of a horse by appealing to its rider. What we want to understand is the 
power in the body (the horse) to organize and produce itself. Proposing that there is an 
immaterial principle wielding or piloting that body is a non-sequitur. Such a principle 
presupposes the body (the ship or horse) is already given, with whatever formative powers of 
self-maintenance it may have. For this reason, although not contradictory, it’s not going to 
help us comprehend these self-active material powers. 
The second option Kant considers is that the soul is itself the craftsman of the body. 
Continuing with the ship analogy, we might think of the soul as though it were either the ship’s 
builder or an engineer, repairing engine damage while the voyage is underway, or both. Kant 
rejects this option because on it “the product must be withdrawn from (corporeal) nature.” 
But while it is clear why this proposal would withdraw the producer from material, physical 
nature, why would it also withdraw the product? After all, the product is the organism, and 
organisms are in the natural world. Well, as we just saw, in an organism the parts are both 
cause and effect of each other. They are both producer and produced. So the product is itself, 
in turn, the producer. But if that is the peculiar structure of the formative power in organisms 
as material beings, then because on our analogy the producer is immaterial, the product would 
need to be immaterial also. But that would remove the product from material, physical nature, 
and make the kind of causality in question not so much that of life (a soul’s communion with 
a body), as that of the connection between two immaterial things.  
Since the self-organizing power is not analogous to life in either way, the kind of causal 
powers we encounter in living beings as living beings cannot explain the natural self-organizing 
power found in organisms. This self-organizing power is an inner power of self-motion. So 
the self-organizing power cannot be accounted for through the mere mechanism of nature: 
matter’s outer or inner forces. Yet matter, as matter, is also inert. This puts Kant in a 
paradoxical situation. Certain material beings present us with a kind of self-motion that cannot 
be explained, either by the powers found in dead matter, or by appealing to immaterial powers, 
since these can’t figure in a science of such matter.  
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Nonetheless, outside the context of natural teleology, Kant will sometimes appeal to 
life to exposit the inner motions of organisms. For example, in presenting why pre-established 
harmony is a worse view of the interaction between mind and body than physical influx, he 
claims that “the soul avails itself of the nerves as instruments [Werkzeuge] and through these 
immediately influences the remaining parts of the body; on the other hand the nerves are also 
the instruments [Werkzeuge] through which the body influences the soul” (Met-M, 29:908, 
1782/83). Here the body and the soul work on one another, each being the product and the 
producer of the other.  
This is strikingly similar to the way he has described the causality of the formative 
power, insofar as the parts of the organism are instruments (Werkzeuge) of one another and 
the whole (KU, 5:374), and the nerves are instruments (Werkzeuge) of the body and soul (Met-
M, 29:908). This then suggests that the nerves are analogous to the parts of the body that are 
being used as instruments. The parts of the body that are using the nerves would be analogous 
to the parts of the body that are using its other parts. And the soul that is acting on the body 
through the nerves is analogous to the whole organism, with its formative power, that is 
ordering the parts of the body in relation to one another through these parts. 
In this way, the third option for understanding the analogy with life can help make the 
formative power more comprehensible, even if it is not strictly analogous, and is not 
admissible in natural teleology. But so long as the context allows abstraction from the soul’s 
immateriality and the body’s materiality (as in psychology), it is permissible to appeal to the 
way that the soul grounds motions in the body. Specifically, souls provide a cohesive account 
of their psychological, supersensible, and physical powers and thereby account for their 
paradoxical self-motion, even if this account is not a natural one. 
 
§5 – The formative power as a life power? 
 Kant introduces the analogy with life to clarify “nature and its capacity in organized 
products,” which he has just characterized through the formative power:  
An organized being is thus not a mere machine, for that has only a motive power, while the 
organized being possesses in itself a formative power, and indeed one that it communicates to 
the matter, which does not have it (it organizes the latter): thus it has a self-propagating 
formative power, which cannot be explained through the capacity for movement alone (that 
is, mechanism). (KU, 5:374) 
Ina Goy has argued that it is ambiguous whether Kant holds the formative power is material 
or immaterial (2014, 53). The analogy with life shows that it is not.  
 9 
First, we have seen why the formative power can seem immaterial. Organisms are not 
dead matter, only changed by external (or chemical) causes, but have a self-propagating 
formative power, which seems to be a limited kind of self-motion. “We know no other internal 
principle in a substance for changing its state except desiring” (MFNS, 4:544). And, in general, 
“[a]n internally active power in a being is called life, our own state is a state of representation 
<status repraesentativus>, accordingly in a living being we can always imagine a power of 
representation <vim repraesentativam>” (Met-V, 28:448-449). A subject with powers of 
representation, however, is immaterial, and has a supersensible soul. Since the formative power 
is expressed in the self-movement of organisms, it is like such an immaterial soul. Thus, it too 
can seem immaterial.  
This seeming, however, must be deceptive. Even prior to introducing the formative 
power Kant has clarified that as natural ends, organized beings are bodies: physical, material 
beings (KU, 5:373). He has argued that insofar as the formative power is cognitively admissible 
in any physical natural science, such as natural teleology, it will be a physical non-living power, 
like attraction and repulsion or combustion and acidification. Perhaps Kant holds every 
organism, necessarily, is a living being with a soul, but such supersensible souls cannot be 
objects of study in sciences of the sensible, natural world.10  
Furthermore, we saw that Kant rejects the analogy between the formative power of 
organisms and life on the grounds that, if the analogy were exact, then the material body itself 
would be immaterial. This was because life was the faculty of an immaterial being to interact 
with a material one. The very same reason would apply to the formative power. So the 
formative power cannot be immaterial.  
In this respect, Kant rejects the Lebenskräfte of the vitalists. After all, they are life-
powers. They are attempts to explain the formative power of the organism through an analogy 
with life. Even if there is something sound in the motivation behind positing such powers, the 
analogy cannot strictly hold.  
Should we then conclude that Kant’s formative power is a material power? If we could 
determinately cognize this power, it would be material. Still, if claiming it is material carries 
the connotation that it belongs to the mechanism of nature, then Kant’s answer is equally 
 
10 In “Kant on Plants” I argue that in fact Kant holds every organism, necessarily, is alive. So if I am right, we 
must regulatively judge both (a) that there is a formative power belonging to the material organism, and (b) that 
there is a soul that is an immaterial life principle standing in communion with this organism. (a) belongs to natural 
teleology, (b) does not, although (b) would belong to, say, rational psychology. 
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“no.” After all, we must investigate organisms as natural ends (KU, 5:373). We can make sense 
of their structure only through the ideas we posit of them and their species-forms. Their 
formative powers are self-propagating powers which act both to maintain the order among 
their parts, and to take new matter into their organism. We make sense of these powers 
through an analogy with our own will: just as our will acts to bring about its ends, so their 
formative powers act to bring about the organism. Unlike in our case, however, we don’t have 
firsthand knowledge of a subject possessing these ends. So we can only judge reflectively that it 
is as though the formative power were acting for an end, without being able to claim that there 
is, in nature, such a real cause. Nonetheless, the only way that Kant thinks natural teleology 
can make sense of natural ends is through such reflective judgments. In this respect, we must 
reflectively posit non-mechanical (non-chemical) formative powers—powers quite similar to 
the Lebenskräfte of the vitalists—even if there will never be a Newton “of a blade of grass” 
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